We analyze the incentives of a telecommunications incumbent to invest and give access to a downstream entrant to a next generation network, NGN. We model the industry as a duopoly, where a vertically integrated incumbent and a downstream entrant, that requires access to the incumbent's network, compete on Hotelling's line. The incumbent can invest in the deployment of a NGN that improves the quality of the retail services. Access to the old network is regulated, but access to the NGN is not.
Introduction
The deployment of next generation networks, NGNs, leading to a multi-service network for audio, video, and data services, sets the telecommunications sector on the verge of a new era.
1 In order to give …rms the right incentives to invest, and to promote an e¢ cient use of these infrastructures, sectorial regulators must set an adequate regulatory framework for these new telecommunications networks.
Sectoral regulators are considering three main regulatory approaches:
(i) The Continuity approach: This approach consists of maintaining the current regulatory system. Accordingly, the review of the market analysis follows the course already established, with the recourse to regulatory instruments in force and, presumably, with a substantial con…rmation of the main regulatory measures in place.
(ii) The Forbearance approach: This approach consists of the abstention from regulatory intervention with regard to broadband networks. The absence of intervention may be permanent or temporary.
(iii) The Equality of Access approach: This approach consists on the enforcement of the principle of "equality of access"to NGNs, and the principle of "equivalence of input"to the incumbent's wholesale o¤er, with a concurring progressive liberalization of the retail o¤ers.
In this article, we analyze, in the context of the forbearance approach, the incentives of a telecommunications incumbent to: (i) invest in a NGN, and (ii) give access to the network to a downstream entrant.
We model the telecommunications industry as a di¤erentiated products duopoly, where an incumbent and an entrant compete on Hotelling's line (Hotelling, 1929) . The incumbent is a vertically integrated …rm that owns a network, and operates on the retail market. The entrant operates on the retail market, and requires access to the incumbent's network. The incumbent can invest in the deployment of a NGN that improves the quality of the retail services. Access to the old network is regulated, but access to the new network is not.
2
In this context, conceding access to the NGN allows the entrant to increase the quality of its product, and has two opposing e¤ects on the incumbent's pro…t. First, it has the negative e¤ect of reducing the retail pro…ts of the incumbent: the retail e¤ect. Second, it 1 A Next Generation Network is a "(...) packet-based network able to provide telecommunication services and able to make use of multiple broadband, QoS-enabled transport technologies and in which service-related functions are independent from underlying transport related technologies." See ITU (2001) . 2 Not regulating the new network corresponds, e.g., to the case of the US, where Verizon is deploying a next generation network, but is only obliged to o¤er to entrants wholesale services equivalent to those it already o¤ered through the old network.
has the positive e¤ect of increasing the wholesale pro…ts of the incumbent: the wholesale e¤ect. To understand this last e¤ect note that, if the entrant uses the NGN, it produces a higher quality product, and thereby earns higher pro…ts. This allows the incumbent to charge a higher access price, which increases the wholesale pro…ts.
We distinguish two cases: (i) the quality improvement generated by the investment is large drastic innovation, and (ii) the quality improvement generated by the investment is small non-drastic innovation. In the former case, the entrant, using the old network, cannot compete against the incumbent, using the new network, even if the access price is at marginal cost. In the latter case it can, if the access price is low enough.
If the innovation is drastic, the incumbent always invests in the NGN, but does not give access to the entrant, which is forced out of the market.
If the innovation is non-drastic, the regulator can control, through the regulation of the old network, whether the incumbent: (i) invests in a NGN, and (ii) gives access to the NGN. If the access price to the old network is low, the incumbent has low wholesale and retail pro…ts on the old network. If the incumbent invests, it voluntarily gives access to the entrant because the entrant can always compete through the old network. In addition, by investing the incumbent increases its wholesale and retail pro…t. If the access price to the old network increases to intermediate values, the incumbent still gives access to the entrant. However, the incremental pro…t from investment decreases, essentially because it raises the incumbent's wholesale pro…t on the old network. Finally, if the access price to the old network increases to high values, the incumbent, by investing, forecloses the market because the entrant can no longer compete through the old network. Since the incumbent faces no competition if it invests, the incremental pro…t from investment increases. Thus, if the innovation is non-drastic, there is no monotonic relation between the access price to the old network and the incumbent's incentives to invest.
When the innovation is non-drastic, interestingly, a regulatory moratorium is socially optimal if the innovation is large, while a duopoly on the NGN is socially optimal if the innovation is small.
We also analyze the case where both …rms can invest in the deployment of a NGN. If the investment cost is small, the possibility of both …rms deploying a NGN may increase or decrease welfare, compared with the case where only the incumbent can invest. If the investment cost is large, the possibility of both …rms investing never increases welfare, although this does not result from a duplication of the investment cost.
The academic literature on regulation only recently started to address the relation be-tween access pricing and investment. Guthrie (2006) surveys the recent literature on the relationship between infrastructure investment and the di¤erent regulatory regimes. He concludes that much remains to be done. Valletti (2003) reviews the static access pricing literature, and provides a discussion about the linkage between access pricing and investment incentives by relating them with questions common to R&D. Gans (2001) analyzes an investment timing game where two …rms compete to invest in a new technology, but there is only one investment. He shows that the regulator can induce the leader to invest at the socially optimal date through the use of the access price. Gans and King (2004) study the impact of access regulation on the timing of infrastructure investment, when there is uncertainty about the investment returns. This article suggests the use of a regulatory moratorium when the regulator has commitment problems. Vareda and Hoernig (2007) study the investment of two operators in new infrastructures, which allows them to o¤er new services, and show that a regulatory moratorium may be a necessary tool to give the leader the correct incentives to invest, at the same time that allows to charge a lower access price later on. Foros (2004) shows, under the context of quality upgrades investment, that an incumbent …rm may have incentives to give access to its network to an entrant, if the entrant has a higher ability to use the improved input quality. Otherwise, the incumbent foreclosures the market. Kotakorpi (2006) considers a model with vertical di¤erentiation, and …nds that, in case of an unregulated market, an incumbent …rm may under-invest in quality upgrades, foreclosing the market. Bourreau and Dogan (2005) show that an incumbent operator may have incentives to give voluntarily access to an entrant in order to delay its investment in a competitive network. Brito et al. (2008) analyze if twopart access tari¤s solve the dynamic consistency problem of the regulation of NGNs, and show that this is only possible under restrictive circumstances. Caillaud and Tirole (2004) analyze the funding of an infrastructure, when an incumbent has private information about the pro…tability of the investment, and the regulator does not have access to taxpayers' money. None of these papers consider the possibility of having one regulated and one unregulated network operating at the same time.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. We describe the model in Section 2. In Section 3, we characterize the equilibrium of the game. In Section 4, we discuss an extension. Finally, in Section 5, we conclude. All proofs are in the Appendix.
Model

Environment
Consider a telecommunications industry where two …rms, the incumbent and the entrant, sell horizontally di¤erentiated products. The incumbent, …rm i, is a vertically integrated …rm that owns a bottleneck input, to which we refer to as the old network. The old network, network o, is a telephone network with a local access network based on the twisted pair of copper wire. The incumbent can invest to deploy a next generation network. The next generation network is also a bottleneck input that allows the supply of retail products of a higher quality than those supplied through the old network. We refer to the next generation network as the new network, or network n. The entrant, …rm e, only operates in the retail market, and has to buy access to the network of the incumbent. We index …rms with subscript j = i; e, and networks with subscript v = o; n. There is a third party in the industry, the sectoral regulator. Even if the new network is deployed, the incumbent must o¤er access to the old network at a regulated access price. Access to the new network is not mandatory. However, the incumbent may voluntarily sell access to the entrant. Costs and demand are common knowledge.
The game has …ve stages which unfold as follows. In stage 1, the sectoral regulator sets the access price to the old network. In stage 2, the incumbent decides whether to invest.
In stage 3, if investment took place, the incumbent o¤ers the entrant an access price to the new network. In stage 4, the entrant chooses which network to use, if any. In stage 5, the incumbent and the entrant compete on retail tari¤s.
Sectoral Regulator
The regulator sets the per unit access price of telecommunication services the entrant must pay to the incumbent to have access to old network, the access price, denoted by o on [0; +1).
3
The regulator maximizes social welfare, i.e., the sum of the …rms'pro…ts and the consumer surplus, denoted by W .
3 Regulating telecommunications markets by intervening at the wholesale level, namely by setting access prices, corresponds to the current EU and US practice.
Consumers
There is a large number of consumers, formally a continuum, whose measure we normalize to 1. Consumers are uniformly distributed along a Hotelling line segment of length 1, facing transportation costs tx to travel distance x, with t on (0; +1). Consumers are otherwise homogeneous. As in Biglaiser and DeGraba (2001) , we assume each consumer has a demand function for telecommunications services given by
is the number of units of telecommunication services purchased from …rm j, p j on (0; z + v )
is the per unit price of telecommunication services of …rm j, z is a parameter on 4 3 p 6t; +1 , and v is a parameter that takes value 0 for products supplied through the old network, i.e., for v = o, and takes value z on (0; +1) for products supplied through the new network, i.e., for v = n. 4 This means that consumers are willing to pay a premium for services delivered over the new network. The lower limit on z implies that all consumers have a positive surplus under the di¤erent market structures.
Let := z (2z + z ). For p j = 0, the incremental consumer surplus from the investment is 1 2
. We take as a measure of quality improvement enabled by the new network.
Firms
The incumbent produces an input that: (i) uses in the production of a retail product, or (ii) sells to the entrant.
The incumbent is located at point 0 and the entrant at point 1 of the line segment where consumers are distributed.
Firms charge consumers two-part retail tari¤s, denoted by
where F j on [0; +1) is the …xed fee of …rm j.
The incumbent can invest in a new network at a …xed cost of I. We assume that I belongs to 0; 1 2
. The upper limit on I ensures that the investment on a new network is socially optimal. In Section 4 we allow both …rms to invest.
Regarding the quality improvement enabled by the new network, we distinguish two cases: (i) if z is on p z 2 + 6t z; +1 , we say that the investment generates a drastic innovation; (ii) if z is on 0; p z 2 + 6t z , we say that the investment generates a nondrastic innovation. For notational convenience we use the equivalent condition that is on [6t; +1) for drastic innovation, and that is on (0; 6t) for non-drastic innovation.
All of the incumbent's marginal costs are constant and equal to zero. The entrant has marginal cost v on f o ; n g, which corresponds to the unit price paid for access to the old or new networks, respectively.
Given ( o ; n ), the entrant can either: (i) accept o¤er n , and use the new network,
(ii) accept o¤er o , and use the old network, or (iii) reject o¤ers n and o , and exit the market.
Denote by D j , the demand, in terms of consumers, for …rm j = i; e. The pro…ts of …rm j = i; e for the whole game are:
Equilibrium Concept
The sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium is: (i) a regulated access tari¤ for the old technology, (ii) an investment decision, (iii) an access price for the new network, (iv) a decision of which network to use, and (v) a set of retail tari¤s, such that:
(E1) the retail tari¤s maximize the …rms'pro…ts, given the access tari¤s, the investment decision and the entry decision;
(E2) the entry decision maximizes the entrant's pro…ts, given the access tari¤s, the incumbent's investment decision, and the optimal retail tari¤s function;
(E3) the access tari¤ for the new network maximizes the incumbent's pro…ts, given the access tari¤ for the old network, the incumbent's decision to invest, the optimal entry decision and the optimal retail tari¤s function;
(E4) the investment decision maximizes the incumbent's pro…ts, given the access tari¤ for the old network, the optimal access tari¤ function for the new network, the optimal entry decision and the optimal retail tari¤s function;
(E5) the access tari¤ for the old network maximizes social welfare, given the optimal investment decision, the optimal access tari¤ function for the new network, the optimal entry decision and the optimal retail tari¤s function.
Equilibrium
In this Section, we characterize the equilibrium of the game, which we construct by working backwards.
5 For each consumer served by the entrant the incumbent earns v (z + p e ), i.e., the wholesale markup times the number of minutes sold to each consumer. This represents the opportunity cost for the incumbent of serving directly each consumer.
Retail Price Stage
We characterize the equilibrium of the retail price game for …ve cases: (i) the incumbent does not invest in the new network, and the entrant exits the market, (ii) the incumbent invests in the new network, and the entrant exits the market (iii) the incumbent does not invest in the new network, and the entrant stays in the market, (iv) the incumbent invests in the new network, the entrant stays in the market, and selects the old network, and (v) the incumbent invests in the new network, the entrant stays in the market, and selects the new network. In cases (i)-(ii) the retail market is a monopoly. In cases ( We start with the following Lemma.
Lemma 1: In equilibrium, …rms set the marginal price of the two-part retail tari¤ at marginal cost, i.e., p i = 0 and p e = v , v = o; n.
As usual with two-part tari¤s, …rms set the marginal price of the retail tari¤ at marginal cost to maximize the gross consumer surplus, and then try to extract this surplus using the …xed part.
Given Lemma 1, from now on we only discuss the determination of the …xed fees.
Monopoly
Next, we characterize the equilibria of the retail game for the two cases where the retail market is a monopoly, which is given by the next Lemma.
Lemma 2: If the retail market is a monopoly, in equilibrium, the incumbent charges the …xed fee, for = n; o:
The net pro…ts of the incumbent for = n; o, are:
Duopoly
Next, we characterize the equilibria of the retail price game for the three cases where the retail market is a duopoly, which is given by the next Lemma.
. Parameter D measures the incumbent's quality advantage with respect to the entrant.
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Lemma 3: If the retail market is a duopoly, in equilibrium, the incumbent and the entrant charge …xed fees, for j = o; b; n:
The net pro…ts of the incumbent and the entrant, gross of the …xed component of the access tari¤, for j = o; b; n, are, respectively:
In a duopoly, the pro…t of the incumbent is non-decreasing in the marginal access price, while the pro…t of the entrant is non-increasing in the marginal access price. 7 When the marginal access price increases, the marginal cost of the entrant increases relative to that of the incumbent. As a consequence, the market share, and thereby the pro…t of the incumbent increases, while the entrant's pro…t decreases.
6 Clearly, in case 
Network Choice Stage
Next, we analyze the entrant's decision of which network to use. (ii) Let there be investment, and let the innovation be drastic, i.e., let be on [6t; +1).
The entrant:
(iii) Let there be investment, and let the innovation be non-drastic, i.e., let be on
Cases (i) and (ii) are similar in the sense that there are only two viable alternatives for the entrant: accept access to the network that the incumbent uses, or exit the market. In case (i) the entrant's decision depends only on o , whereas in case (ii) the entrant's decision depends only on n . The entrant either uses the same network as the incumbent, if the access price is not too high, i.e., if v is on 0; p 6t , or exits the market. Case (iii) presents a third alternative for the entrant if o is su¢ ciently low and n is su¢ ciently high: accept access to the old network when the incumbent uses the new one.
Access Price O¤er Stage
Next, we characterize the incumbent's equilibrium access price o¤er, which is presented in the next Lemma. Denote by n ( o ), the optimal value of the access price to the new network, given o .
Lemma 5: (i) Let the innovation be drastic, i.e., let be on [6t; +1). In equilibrium, the incumbent o¤ers:
(ii) Let the innovation be non-drastic, i.e., let be on [0; 6t). In equilibrium, the incumbent o¤ers:
If the innovation is drastic, the entrant, using the old network, cannot compete against the incumbent, using the new network. This happens because in addition to the marginal cost disadvantage, the entrant sells an inferior service. Thus, the incumbent o¤ers a unacceptably high access price, i.e., n ( o ) = p 6t, to induce the entrant to exit, and thereby become a monopolist. The same happens if the innovation is non-drastic, but the access price to the old network is high enough.
If the innovation is non-drastic and the access price to the old network is low, the entrant, using the old network, can compete against the incumbent, using the new network. Thus, since the incumbent cannot avoid competition from the entrant, it prefers to o¤er also a low access price to the new network. Conceding access to the new network allows the entrant to increase the quality of its product, and has two opposing e¤ects on the incumbent's pro…t.
First, it has the negative e¤ect of reducing the retail pro…ts of the incumbent: the retail e¤ect. Second, it has the positive e¤ect of increasing the wholesale pro…ts of the incumbent:
the wholesale e¤ect. To understand this last e¤ect note that, if the entrant uses the new network, it produces a higher quality product, and thereby earns higher pro…ts. This allows the incumbent to charge a higher access price, which increases wholesale pro…ts. The latter e¤ect dominates. 
Investment Stage
Next, we analyze the incumbent's decision to invest in the new network.
the incumbent's incremental pro…t from the investment, given that in stage 3 it o¤ers an access price n ( o ).
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The next auxiliary Remark states some useful properties of function i ( ). , if and only if, z is on (z 2 ; +1).
The following Lemma characterizes the optimal investment decision.
Lemma 6: (i) Let the innovation be drastic, i.e., let be on [6t; +1). The incumbent invests for all o on [0; +1).
(ii) Let the innovation be non-drastic, i.e., let be on [0; 6t).
The incumbent:
If the innovation is drastic, the incumbent always invests. This allows it to foreclose the market, and thus become a monopolist.
If the innovation is non-drastic, given the assumption on I, the incumbent invests for any (I; o ), if z is high, i.e., if z is on (z 2 ; +1). If z is high, investment is very pro…table,
given that the switch from o to n a¤ects a larger number of units per consumer. However,
for low values of z, if the innovation is non-drastic, and o is on 0; p 6t , the incumbent may not always …nd it pro…table to invest.
An interesting implication of the properties of i ( ), presented in Remark 1, is that the decision to invest may not be monotonic in o . Let z be on (z 1 ; z 2 ). First, for o 9 Recall that z on 0; p z 2 + 6t z is equivalent to on (0; 6t). 10 Thresholds z 1 and z 2 are functions of (t; ). The functional forms of z 1 and z 2 are presented in the 
Regulation of the Old Network Stage
Next, we discuss the regulator's choice of the access price to the old network.
The next Remark presents the regulator's objective function.
Remark 2:
(I) Welfare: (i) under monopoly is given by:
(ii) under duopoly with both …rms using network v = o; n, is given by: 12 A higher o also results in a higher n and, hence, in larger wholesale pro…t after investment. However, the impact on wholesale pro…t is stronger without investment when o is small. Take, for instance, the limit case of o = 0. Then, as
= 0, a small increase in o does not change the incumbent's pro…t when there is investment and access is granted at n ( o ). In contrast, the incumbent's pro…t when there is no-investment increases with o , given our assumption on z. Therefore, for small values of o , a small increase in the regulated access price decreases the incentives to invest.
[F igure 2] Figure 2 illustrates the welfare function, W dv ( ). Function W dv ( ) is quasi-convex in v because increasing v has the following three e¤ects. First, it has the negative e¤ect of increasing transportation costs. Second, it has the negative e¤ect of leading the entrant to set a higher marginal retail price. Third, it has the positive e¤ect of making some consumers shift from the entrant, where they have face a higher marginal retail price, to the incumbent, where they face a lower marginal retail price. If the access price is zero, the third e¤ect is absent because the marginal price set by both …rms is equal. Thus, increasing v unambiguously lowers welfare. If v is su¢ ciently high, the third e¤ect may more than compensate the other two.
For a given , investment shifts the welfare function upwards. This occurs because
However, the access price to the new network will not be equal to the access price to the old network. 
Thus, if the network in use is the old network, the regulator prefers a duopoly, if o is on h 0; t . We explain this in Section 3.6.
The next Lemma characterizes the socially optimal access price to the old network.
Lemma 7: (i) Let the innovation be drastic, i.e., let be on [6t; +1). In equilibrium, the regulator sets o on [0; +1). (ii) Let the innovation be non-drastic, i.e., let be on (0; 6t).
In equilibrium, the regulator sets:
for on 0; If the innovation is non-drastic, for low values of , the regulator sets an o that leads to a duopoly, while for high values of , the regulator sets an o that leads to a monopoly.
Equilibrium of the Whole Game
Having solved all the …ve stages of the commitment game, we can now summarize the equilibrium of the whole game, which we present in the next Proposition for further reference.
Proposition 1:
(I) If is on 0; Case (III) is simple. With a drastic innovation, the entrant cannot compete with the incumbent even with access to the old network at marginal cost. As the incumbent is free to choose any access price to the new network, it sets a prohibitively high price, thus foreclosing the market. With access price as its only regulatory instrument, the regulator cannot change this outcome, and any access price may occur in equilibrium.
On the contrary, for a non-drastic innovation the regulator's choice of o has an impact on the market structure. The regulator may induce a duopoly by setting a low access price, or may induce a monopoly by setting a high access price; and both may be optimal.
On the one hand, a duopoly results in lower average transportation costs but, on the other hand, consumers served by the entrant purchase less. This occurs because …rms set two-part retail tari¤s, with the marginal price at marginal cost. If the access price is above marginal cost, the consumers served by the entrant consume a suboptimal amount. Whether duopoly fares better or worse than monopoly, depends on the magnitude of the price of access to the new network. If is high -but still within the limits of a non-drastic innovationthe incumbent sets a high access price because n ( ) is increasing in : the access price to the new network is higher, the higher the increase in quality enabled by the new network.
Thus, if is low, a duopoly on the new network is socially preferable to a monopoly on this network. If is high, a monopoly on the new network is socially preferable to a duopoly on this network. The latter possibility may be interpreted as a regulatory moratorium.
Interestingly, for a non-drastic innovation, if is high, the equilibrium access price to the old network is also high. This is seemingly counter-intuitive. One might expect that when the social value of the innovation is high, the access price to the old network is set low to give the incumbent incentive to invest. However, a high access price also gives the incumbent incentive to invest, allowing it to foreclose the market by investing. In fact, investment occurs both with o = 0 and o = p 6t. The regulator's prefers the latter case because, if is high, a monopoly on the new network is socially preferable to a duopoly.
Extension
In this section, we consider the possibility of both …rms investing in the new network.
Consider the model of Section 2, except that: in stage 2 both …rms decide whether to invest; in stage 3, if only one …rm invested, it makes an access price o¤er to the rival; and, in stage 4, if one of the …rms did not invest it chooses which network to use. We assume that the entrant and the incumbent have the same investment cost, and that the innovation is non-drastic. 13 We start by solving the equilibrium of the game for a given o . Later, we discuss the impact on welfare of both …rms being able to invest.
If only the incumbent invests, the payo¤s are the same as in Section 3.
If only the entrant invests, its net pro…t equals dn i ( z ; z ; n ; z), while the incumbent's net pro…t equals dn e ( z ; z ; n ; z). By the same reasoning as in Lemma 4, if only the entrant invests, it sets access price n (0) = p .
If both …rms invest, the net pro…ts are dn i ( z ; z ; 0; z) for both …rms, as this case is similar to a situation where a …rm gives access to the other one at n = 0.
the entrant's incremental pro…t from the investment, given that the incumbent invested.
The following Lemma presents the equilibria of the investment game.
14 Lemma 8: In equilibrium:
(i) both …rms invest if and only if I is on 0; ejI ( z ; 0; z) ; (ii) the entrant invests and the incumbent does not if and only if I is on ejI ( z ; 0; z); +1).
(iii) the incumbent invests and the entrant does not if and only if I is on:
This Lemma suggests the following remarks. First, if the investment cost is low, both …rms invest. Second, if both …rms invest, the equilibrium is unique. Otherwise, it is possible to have two equilibria, one where only the entrant invests, and another where only the incumbent invests. Third, given that only one …rm invests, it is more likely that it is the entrant which invests. This happens because the incumbent pays a lower access price when it asks for access to the rival's network than the entrant, given that it has an outside option of using the old network. Hence, its incentives to invest, given that the entrant has invested, are relatively smaller than the entrant's incentives to invest, given that the incumbent has invested. Suppose that I is on ejI ( z ; 0; z); +1 . Since the investment cost is high, in equilibrium only one …rm invests. There are two cases of interest, on 0; t . If only the incumbent is able to invest, then, from Proposition 1, it invests, o¤ers n = p , and the entrant accepts. If both …rms are able to invest and in equilibrium only the entrant invests, there will be a duopoly with n (0) = p . In addition, if both …rms are able to invest and in equilibrium the incumbent invests, there will be either a duopoly with t; +1 . If only the incumbent is able to invest, it invests, o¤ers n = p 6t, and becomes a monopolist. If both …rms are able to invest, the possible equilibria are as above.
With on 6 5 t; +1 , welfare under monopoly with n = p 6t exceeds welfare under duopoly
Hence, independently of the regulator's choice of o , welfare cannot increase when both …rms are able to invest if costs are so high that only one …rm invests in equilibrium. The explanation is the following. For on 0; 6 5 t ; from Proposition 1 there will be a duopoly with a low access price when the incumbent is the only …rm able to invest. When both …rms are able to invest, access price o = 0 leads to the same result, regardless of who invests. For on 6 5 t; +1 , it follows from Proposition 1 that there will be a monopoly when the incumbent is the only …rm able to invest. If the entrant invests it provides access to the incumbent, and the market structure is a duopoly, whereas if the incumbent invests there may be a monopoly. Interestingly, as the welfare function is quasi-convex, if is on 6 5 t; +1 , a monopoly leads to a higher welfare than a duopoly on the new network with n on p ; +1 . Therefore, investment by the entrant may reduce welfare.
Suppose that I is on 0; ejI ( z ; 0; z) . Since the investment cost is low, in equilibrium both …rms will invest. Thus, welfare is independent of o . For on 0; Thus, if both …rms are able to invest, instead of just the incumbent, welfare may increase or decrease. This stems from the trade-o¤ between access to the new network being priced at marginal cost for both …rms, and the duplication of the investment cost.
We summarize the previous discussion in the next Remark. 16 Setting o = 0 is a su¢ cient condition for the expected welfare to be the same when only the incumbent is able to invest or when both …rms are able to invest. Therefore, o = 0 is the socially optimal access price if is on 0;
Remark 3: Suppose that both …rms can invest. (i) Let I be on ejI ( z ; 0; z); +1 , such that in equilibrium only one …rm invests. Welfare does not increase compared with the case where only the incumbent invests. (ii) Let I be on 0;
ejI ( z ; 0; z); +1 , such that in equilibrium both …rms invest. Welfare may increase or decrease compared with the case where only the incumbent can invest.
Conclusions
In this article, we analyzed the incentives of a telecommunications incumbent to invest and give access to a downstream entrant to a next generation network. We distinguished between the cases of a drastic and non-drastic innovation. If the innovation is drastic, the incumbent always invests, but does not give access to the entrant. If the innovation is nondrastic, the regulator can control, through the regulation of the old network, whether the incumbent (i) invests in a NGN, and (ii) gives access to the network. If the innovation is non-drastic and if the access price to the old network is low, the incumbent voluntarily gives access to the new network. If the innovation is non-drastic, there is no monotonic relation between the access price to the old network and the incumbent's incentives to invest. A regulatory moratorium emerges as socially optimal, if innovation is large but non-drastic.
Appendix
Lemma 1: See DeGraba and Biglaiser.
Lemma 2: Consumers purchase from the monopolist if and only if
Assuming an interior solution, the pro…t maximizing price is:
However, we do not have an interior solution since, given our assumption on z,
In this case, the optimal …xed fee and pro…ts are:
Lemma 3: To avoid a multiplicity of cases, we assume that …rm j = i; e faces demand y j = (z + j ) p j with j on f0; z g. Additionally, the entrant has costs v on f o ; n g, with max f o ; n g < z + e . We start by …nding the consumer who is indi¤erent between buying from the incumbent or from the entrant:
with < z:
The demand function, in terms of consumers, facing the incumbent is
x (F i ; F e ; i ; e ; ; z)
Clearly, D e = 1 D i .
Given this indi¤erent consumer, and the fact that p i = 0 and p e = , pro…t functions, excluding investment costs, become: i = F i x (F i ; F e ; i ; e ; ; z) + (z + e ) (1 x (F i ; F e ; i ; e ; ; z)) e = F e (1 x (F i ; F e ; i ; e ; ; z)):
Maximizing each pro…t function with respect to the …xed fee, we …nd:
The indi¤erent consumer is given by
with < p 6t D : We now have to ensure that all consumers have a positive surplus, independently of the market structure considered:
When both …rms use the same network it must be that 6t + 4 (z + i ) 2 (z + i ) 2 3 2 < 0 for all < p 6t. This expression is maximized when = restrictions are veri…ed for z > 3 p t:
We now show that the incumbent's pro…t function, i ( i ; e ; ; z) ; increases in for
Thus, the incumbent's pro…t increases with if
Additionally,
p 6t; which is true given our assumption on z:
When > p 6t D the entrant will set F e = 0. In this case, the incumbent's demand is
The best response is to set If 6t < 0 the entrant would have a non-positive market for any o 0.
Lemma 5: Assume initially that o < p 6t : We start by …nding out the best o¤er for n in the incumbents perspective that is accepted by the entrant. This is the solution to max n dn i ( z ; z ; n ; z) ; subject to n < p 2 o + : Therefore, the problem is to:
with …rst-order conditions 3 n 30t n + 18t (z + z ) = 0: Note that evaluated at n = 0 the derivative is positive and that the second derivative -12 ( 2 n 10t) -is always negative, in the relevant range given that n < p 2 o + < p 6t. Thus, there are two candidates for optimum, depending on whether the constraint is binding or not.
The constraint is binding if
As (ii) Assume that < 6t. Assume that o < p 6t : As seen in Lemma 4, the incumbent will always give access to the new network to the entrant if it invests and it will give access to the old network if it does not invest. It will be pro…table to invest if and only if:
Note that we have i (0; o ; z) = 0 and
. Then, the incumbent will prefer that the entrant exits if investment has taken place and this case is equal to (i).
Remark 2: Note that,
t and that
The second derivative at = 0 is t < p 6t is 1 > 0: The third derivative is always non negative. is negative: ; z), and thus, duopoly on the old network with
t is worst than monopoly on the old network, which is worst than a monopoly on the new network.
The regulator's choice is thus between duopoly and monopoly on the new network. To maximize welfare in the case of duopoly, the regulator will set o = 0 leading to n = p :
t this results in higher welfare than the case of monopoly. However, when > 6 5 t;
monopoly on the new network is better than duopoly on the new network, and thus the regulator sets o = p 6t.
Proposition 1: This follows from the Lemmas above.
Lemma 8: We start by showing that (N; N ) cannot be an equilibrium of this game because the entrant will always prefer to invest. A necessary condition for (N; N ) to be an equilibrium is that the entrant prefers not to invest given that the incumbent does not invest. For the case of o < p 6t this corresponds to: We will now analyze the other possibilities. 
Figures
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